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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the implications of adverse selection in the private
annuity market for the pricing of private annuities and the consequent effects
on constrption and bequest behavior. With privately known heterogeneous mor-
tality probabilities, adverse selection causes the rate of return on private
annuities to be less than the actuarially fair rate based on population aver-
age mortality. However, a fully funded social security system with compulsory
participation can offer an implied rate of return equal to the actuarially
fair rate based on population average mortality. Thus, since social security
offers a higher rate of return than private annuities, consumers cannot com-
pletely offset the effects of social security by transacting in the private
annuity market. Using an overlapping generations model with uncertain life-
times, we demonstrate that the introduction of actuarially fair social secu-
rity reduces the steady state rate of return on annuities and raises the
steady state levels of average bequests and average consumption of the young.
The steady state national capital stock rises or falls according to the
strength of the bequest motive.
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Uncertainty about an individual's date of death affects the
individual's consumption and portfolio behavior as well as the bequest ulti-
mately left to the consumer's heirs. The early literature on lifetime uncer-
tainty' focused on the effects of stochastic lifetimes on individual consump-
tion and portfolio behavior, ignoring the effects on the bequests received by
subsequent generations.2 Much recent attention has been devoted to the effects
of stochastic lifetimes on bequests and the implications for the distribution
of wealth and the evolution of the capital stock. Sheshinski and Weiss (1981)
extended the Modigliani—Brumberg (1954) — Samuelson (1958) — Diamond (1965)
overlapping generations model to include uncertain lifetimes. They assumed
that all consumers are identical and, furthermore, that all consumers in a
given cohort die at the same date, thereby leaving identical bequests. How-
ever, if consumers die at different dates, then they will, in general, leave
bequests of different sizes. Abel (1985) and Eckstein, Eichenbauni and Peled
(1985) exploited the iritra—cohort variation in ex post mortality experiences
to analyze the steady state distributions of bequests, consumption and wealth
in models without private annuity markets and with consumers without bequest
motives.3 Abel (1985) also shows that the introduction of fully funded social
security crowds out steady state private wealth by more than one—for—one and
that it reduces all central moments of the steady state distribution of
wealth.
The effects of social security in the presence of uncertain lifetimes
have been studied by Sheshiuski and Weiss (1981) and Abel (1985) in models in
which there is no private annuity market. However, if a competitive annuity
market were introduced into these models, social security would then have no
effect because the rate of return on private annuities would be the same as
—2—
the rate of return implicit in actuarially fair fully funded social security;
thus consi.ers would exactly offset the effects of social security by adjust-
ing their purchases of private annuities. In this paper 'we introduce a
private market for annuities and demonstrate that with privately—known hetero—
genous mortality probabilities, social security does have real effects on the
allocation of consumption. The reason is that adverse selection drives the
rate of return on competitively supplied annuities below the actuarially fair
rate of return based on the population average cx ante mortality probability;
however, because the social security system is compulsory, it is immune to
adverse selection and a fully funded system can offer a rate of return equal
to the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality.
Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985b) examine the welfare—enhancing role
of mandatory social security when the private annuity market is subject to
adverse selection.4 However, there are two features of their model which make
it unsuitable for our purposes. First, because they assume that consumers
have no bequest motive, the availability of annuities implies, as noted by
Yaari (1965), that consumers will hold all of their savings as annuities, and
hence there will be no private intergenerational transfers in the form of
bequests. Second, because the consumption good is a non—producible, non—
storable endowment, aggregate savings is zero in every period; the saving of
the young is exactly offset by the dissaving of the old. In contrast, in the
model presented below, the specification of the utility function with a
bequest motive introduces a non—trivial portfolio allocation problem and leads
to intergenerational transfers in the form of bequests. Secondly, in the model
below, the consumption good can be invested at a rate of return R so that
aggregate saving need not be zero. Thus, this model can be used to analyze
—3—
the effects of social security on capital accumulation.
In section I, we examine the optimal consumption and portfolio behavior
of an individual consumer, taking as given the rate of return on private
annuities and the consumer's inheritance received from his parent. Using the
derived demands for private annuities by consumers with different mortality
probabilities, we study, in section II, the determination of the rate of
return on private annuities. In section III, we analyze the steady state
effects of introducing actuarially fair fully funded social security. We show
that the introduction of fully funded social security leads to an increase in
the steady state consumption of young consumers, an increase in the steady
state level of bequests, and to a reduction in the rate of return on private
annuities. Finally, we show that depending on strength of the bequest motive,
an actuarially fair increase in social security taxes will crowd out private
capital by greater than or less than one—for—one.
1. Consumption and Portfolio Behavior of an Individual
Consider a consumer who may live either one period (with probability p>O)
or two periods (with probability l—p>O). Let I be the initial wealth held by
the consumer at the beginning of his life. (The determination of I will be
discussed below.) During the first period of life the consumer earns a fixed
labor income Y, pays a social security tax T, and consumes an amount
c1 At
the end of the first period, the consumer chooses a portfolio of annuities and
riskiess bonds. Let Q be the amount of annuities held in the portfolio; the
remainder of the portfolio, I + Y —T — c1 — Q, is held in the form of riskless
bonds. A one dollar annuity pays A dollars to the consumer in the following
—4--
period if he survives; if the consumer dies young, the annuity pays nothing to
his heir. A one dollar riskless bond yields R dollars in the following period
to the consumer, if he survives, or to his heir, if the consumer dies young.
As shown in section II, A>R in a competitive annuity market.
At the beginning of the second period, the consumer gives birth to an
heir and then the uncertainty about the length of the consumer's life is
resolved. If the consumer dies at the beginning of the second period, his
heir receives a bequest, BD, consisting of the consumer's riskiess bonds with
accrued interest,
BD=(I+Y_T_c1.Q)R (1)
If the consumer survives to the end of the second period, he receives a social
security payment S, consumes an amount C2, and gives the remainder of his
wealth, Bs, to his heir. Since all uncertainty is resolved at the beginning
of the second period., the consumer who lives for two periods knows at the
beginning of the second period that he will leave a bequest of Bs where
B5 = (I + 'Y — T — c1 — Q)R +QA + S — c2 (2)
We assume that the consumer who survives gives his heir the bequest Bs at the
beginning of the second period. Thus, regardless of whether the consumer
lives one period or two periods, the intergenerational transfer from the con-
sumer to his heir takes place at the beginning of the second period i.e., at
the beginning of the first period of the heir's life.
Let the consumer's utility function be
13(c1) + p8V(BD) + (1—p)&U(c2) + (l—p)&V(B5) (3)
where & (O<&11) is the one—period discount factor, U( ) is a strictly concave
—5--
utility index of the conser's own consumption and V( ) is a strictly concave
index of utility derived from leaving a bequest. The utility function in (1)
is simply the expected value of utility, where the only stochastic element is
the consumer's date of death.5
The consumer maximizes the utility function in (3) subject to his life-
time budget constraint. The lifetime budget constraint is obtained by first
substituting (1) into (2) to obtain
Bs=BD+QA+S_c2 (4)
Then combining (1) and (4) to eliminate Q yields
Bs = A(I + ! —T)+ S — Ac1 — c2 — (5)
Substituting the lifetime budget constraint (5) into the utility function (3)
and differentiating with respect to c1, c2, and B' respectively, yields
U'(c1) = (i—p)&A V'(B5) (6a)
U'(c2) = V7(BS) (6b>
pVt(BD) (l—p) 1E VS(BS) (6c)
Annuities are said to be actuarially fair if the expected rate of return
on an annuity, (i—p)A, is equal to the rate of return on riskless bonds, R.
Note that actuarial fairness implies that = —a-— so that from (6c) weR i—p
obtain VP(BD) = V'(B5) and hence BD Bs. Furthermore, since BD Bs, it fol-
lows from (4) that c2 = QA + S.6 Thus, if the rate of return on private
annuities is actuarially fair, the consumer's portfolio consists of: (1)
riskiess bonds which will be given to his heir as a bequest; and (2) annuities
which, along with the social security payment S, will be used to provide for
second—period consumption.
—6—
If the expected rate of return on annuities is smaller than the riskiess
rate of return R, i.e., A < 1A_ then it follows from (6c) that V'(BP) < V'(B)
so that BD > B3 and (from (4)) C2 > QA + S. In this case the Consumer does
not use annuities to provide for all of second—period consumption; some of
second—period consumption is provided for by riskiess bonds which have a
higher expected rate of return than annuities.7
In order to obtain explicit solutions for the optimal levels of consump—
1—a_1tion and bequests, we assume that U(c)= and V(B)—, as in Hakans—
son (1969), Fischer (1973) and Richard (1975), where ?>O indicates the
strength of the bequest motive and a>O. Therefore the utility function in (3)
is ]iomothetic, and the income expansion path for c1, c2, ED and Bs is a ray
through the origin. The optimal value of each of these variables, as well as
the demand for contingent second—period income QA+S, is proportional to the
expected present value of lifetime resources I + Y — T +AS. It is shown in
Appendix A that
C1 (p,A) = Ø(p,A) (I + Y — T + AS) (7)
wh e r e
0 < (p,A) < 1
and
Q(p,A) + A1S =
'lj(p,A)(I + Y — T + A'S) (8)
where
1(p,A) < 1.
Explicit expressions for ô(p,A) and q1(p,A) are presented in Appendix A. It
can be shown that 8q1/a < 0. Also, q1(p,A) will be positive if and only if
—7-.
1
A > N1_) + ( )U] • R (9)
1 + a
If S=O, then (9) is necessary and sufficient for a positive demand for annui-
ties. With actuarially fair annuities (A=1—), (9) is satisfied.
It is convenient to rewrite (8), the demand for private annuities as
Q(p,A) = q1(p,A)(I + Y — T) — q2(p,A)S (lOa)
where
= [1—q1(p,A)]A1 (lob)
Since Q1(p,A) < 1 and 8q118p < 0, it follows from (lOb) that q2(p,A) > 0 and
8 q2that — > 0. Therefore, if I+Y—T > 0 and S > 0, then
ap —
< . (11)
II. Equilibrium in the Private Annuity Market
Suppose that consers are characterized by different probabil ities, p,
of dying young. We will refer to a consner with a probability p of dying
young as a type p consumer. Except for the difference in p, all consumers have
identical utility functions. Let E(p) be the fraction of young consumers with
probability of dying young less than or equal to p. The support of the dis-
tribution E(p) is [L,R) where 0 < < < 1. We restrict the range of
values of p in the population by assuming that that
(12)
1
(1—ps) (l+?)°+p11X
The effect of this assumption is to guarantee that condition (9) is satisfied
so that if S>0 is sufficiently small, then all consumers will have a positive
—8—
demand for annuities.8
A consumer's probability of dying young, p, is independent of the p of
his parent. Moreover, we assume that each individual knows his own value of p
but that annuity companies and the government are unable to determine an indi-
vidual consumer's p. e assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty; a frac-
tion p of each cohort of type p consumers will die young. Finally, we assume
that annuity companies cannot determine whether an individual consumer holds
annuities from other insurance companies. The effect of this assumption is
that the equilibrium in the annuity market will be a pooling equilibrium
rather than a separating equilibrium.9
Assuming that annuity companies are risk—neutral and perfectly competi-
tive, the expected profits of annuity companies must be equal to zero. Let
M(p,A) be the expected profit per dollar of annuity with rate of return A
issued to a type p consumer. Therefore
M(p,A) = 11 — (1—p)A (13)
so thai = A > 0. It is obvious that the equilibrium rate of return on
ap
annuities, A, must lie between R and R : if A were less than R , then
1—p11
an annuity company could offer a rate higher than A and profitably attract all
buyers of annuities; if A were greater than R then annuity companies would
1-p11
suffer expected losses on all annuities sold.
We will now show that the competitive rate of return on annuities, A,
must be less than A, the actuarially fair rate based on population average
B
— — p
mortality, where A —a--- and p f pdll(p) is the population average probabil—
i—p
—9--
ity of dying young. First, we state the following well—known lemma.
B
LEM(A. Suppose that f(p) 0 as p p and that f(p)dH(p) = 0. If g(p) is
B
strictly increasing, then f(p)g(p)dH(p) 0, with strict inequality if
dH(p) is not degenerate.1°
Let 7r(A;I+Y—T,S) be the expected profit of the annuity industry if the
private annuity rate of return is A. Observe that
H
n(A;I+Y—T,S) = 1f M(p,A)Q*(p,A)dH(p) (14)
where Q*(p,A) = q1(p,A)(I* + Y — T)—q2(p,A)S is average annuity demand of type
p consumers and 1* is the average inheritance received at birth. Using the
relation M(p.A) = M(p,A) + (l—p) (A—A) which follows from (13), we can rewrite
(14) as
B H
p — — p
,t(A;I*+Y—T,S) = f M(p,A)Q*(p,A)dll(p) + (A—A)f (1—p)Q(p,A)dH(p) (15)
Since M(p,X)dB(p) = 0 (fr (13) and the definition of ) and since < 0
(from (11)), the lemma implies that the first integral in (15) is negative.
Since (for S sufficiently nall) the second integral in (15) is positive, it
follows that if A>A, then n(A)<O. The result that IT(A) < 0 is, of course, a
consequence of adverse selection. Therefore, the equilibrium rate of return A
must lie in the open interval (
i—p i—p
The equilibrium rate of return on private annuities, A, must be a root of
the equation n(A) = 0. Since R , R > 0 > r(——) and i(A)
i—p
— 10 —
is a continuous function of A, there is at least one root of it(A) = 0 between
K and for which n'(A) < 0. We demonstrate in Appendix B that, in the
case of logarithmic utility ( = 1), ir(A) is strictly concave for A > R and
thus there is a unique root A of ,t(A) 0 in K ,_i—) and ,t'(A) < 0.11
1_EL
The equilibrium annuity rate of return, A, can be expressed as a function
of I*+Y—T and S. Observe from (lOa) that Q*(p,A) is a linearly homogeneous
function of I*+YT and S. Therefore, from (14), n(A;I*+Y-T,S) also linearly
homogeneous in. I*+Y—T and S. so that if A satisfies ,i(A;I*+Y—T,S) 0, it also
satisfies ,i(A;(I*+Y_T),S) = 0 for any > 0. Hence A can be written as
A = A(I*+Y_T,S) (16)
where A(.,.) is homogeneous of degree zero.
To demonstrate that aA/,3S < 0, recall from (lOa) that an increase in
social security benefits leads type p consumers to reduce their demand for
0 q2
private annuities by q2(p,A). Since > 0, consumers with high p reduce
their annuity demands by more than low p consumers. Furthermore, since high p
consumers begin with a lower demand for annuities than low p consumers, the
percentage reduction in annuity demand is greatest for high p consumers. Now,
since it is the annuities sold to the high p consumers on which annuity com-
panies expect positive profits, this shift in the composition of annuity hold-
ers away from the profitable (high p) consumers leads to a reduction in
expected profits. In order to restore zero expected profits, the equilibrium
rate of return A must fall (since n'(A) < 0). Thus, the partial derivatives
of A(I*÷Y—T,S) are
< 0 (17a)
— 11 —
aL —S a,L > 0 as S > 0 (17b)a(I+Y—T) I*+Y—T as — —
where (17a) follows froa applying Euler's Theorem to A(.,.) which is homogene-
ous of degree zero.
III. The Steady State Effects of Changes in Social Security
Let B(p) denote the actual ex post bequests (per capita) left by the
group of type p consumers born at the beginning of period t. Letting B(p)
denote the bequests (per capita) of the consumers who died young and B(p)
denote the bequests (per capita) of the consumers who survived two periods,
and recalling that a fraction p of type p consumers dies young, we obtain
B(p) = pB(p) + (1—p)B(p) (18)
The homotheticity of preferences implies that B(p) and B(p) are each propor-
tional to the expected present value of lifetime income so that (18) may be
rewritten as
B(p) = O(pA)[IfY_T+çlS1 (19)
where I is the initial bequest (per capita) received at birth; At is the
rate of return on annuities purchased at the end of period t (and which pay
off in period t+1). An expression for 6(pAt) is given iii Appendix A. We will
asse that O<e(p1A)<1 for L < < H12
H
Define B( B(p)dH(p) to be the average bequest left by members of the
generation born at time t. It follows from (19) that
B O(At) [] + Y — T +AS] (20a)
where
— 12 —
= e(pAt)an(p) (20b)
In the steady state B = I so that (dropping the time subscript) (20a) may be
rewritten as
B = AJ (Y—T+AS) (21)
1-(A)
We assume that
A fully funded social security system operates by collecting T from each
young consumer and investing the proceeds in riskiess capital earning a gross
rate of return R. In the following period the social security tax cum
interest, RT, is divided equally among the surviving consumers. Since a frac-
tion 1—p of the consumers survives to the second period, the payment S
received by each surviving consumer is
S=AT (22)
where we recall that is defined as RJ(1—. Equation (22) shows that the
marginal rate of return implicit in the social security system, 4, is A
which, as we have shown in Section II, is greater than A, the equilibrium rate
of return on private annuities. Therefore,. an actuarially fair increase in
social security taxes and benefits increases the expected present value life-
time income I + Y — T + A1S, for a given level of inherited wealth I.
We will confine our attention to a small increase in S and T starting
frc am initial steady state in which S=O. It follows immediately from (lTb)
that a(I*+Y_T)I S=O = 0 so that
dAt — 8A < 0 (23)S=0
Thus, an increase in fully funded social security reduces the steady state
— 13 —
rate of return on annuities.
Henceforth, we asse that a1 (logarithmic utility) so that, as shown in
Appendix D, '(A) < 0. The state state level of bequests is found by substi—
tuting (22) into (21) to obtain
B = p(A) (Y+(A— 1)S) (24)
1-0(A)
Differentiating (24) with respect to S yields
(A) [A - + '(A) y dApdS S0 = — — dS s=o > 0 (25)
1—0(A) (1—0(A))4
where the inequality follows from A<A , 0'(A)<O and (23). The increase in B*
occurs for two reasons. First, since social security pays a higher rate of
return than private annuities, the introduction of social security raises (by
(A1 — X 1)dS) the expected present value of lifetime resources for a given
initial wealth. Second, the fall in A causes the share of lifetime resources
passed on as bequests, (A), to rise. Therefore, the factor in (21)
1 —(A)
rises.
Next we examine the effect of social security on the steady state level
of average consumption of the young. 4 , where
4 = (A)(B*+Y—T+AS)
where
B
6(p,A)dB(p)<1 (26b)
— 14 —
With logarithmic utility, (A) is invariant to A. Therefore, the effect of
social security on 4 is proportional to the effect on B*+Y_T+AT'S which
increases as a result of three effects: (1) B* rises as shown in (25); (2)
since the gross return on social security, SIT, exceeds A, it follows that
—T+AS rises for a given A; and (3) A falls as shown in (23) so that, A1S,
the present value of the social security payment, rises. Therefore, the
expected present value of lifetime resources rises and a fortiori the average
consumption of young consumers also rises.14
The steady state private capital stock at the end of a period is equal to
the saving of young consumers B*+Y—T—c1*. In a fully funded social security
system, the end—of--period capital stock held by the government is T. The
steady state national capital stock K is the sum of private capital and
government capital
(27)
Substituting (24) and (26a) into (27) yields
•= + (A)[Y+A_1_ )S1 (28)
1-(A)
Differentiating (28) with respect to S, we obtain
W 's—o = + 4"A) (K' TA 1) (29)— (1—(A))2 1—(A)
Since '(A)<O it follows from (23) that the first term on the right hand side
of (29) is positive. Since A>A 1 the second term on the right hand side of
(29) will be positive if <(A)<1. In this case, the right hand side of (29)
is unambiguously positive so that the introduction of fully funded social
15 —
security will increase the steady state natci capits. stck Appendix C
provides conditions under .bich ((A)<i. Lt.itive1y. the beç'est motive as
measured by X must be sufficiently strong so that a iarer share of lifetime
resources is devoted to beq.ests than to firt—period onsptin.
In the case in which the first term on the right band side of (29)
remains positive, but the second term is negative. Observe that if )O, then
and the first term om the right band side of becomes zero.
Thus, if the bequest motive is sufficiently weak, then an in fully
funded social security will rethce the total national pitai took in the
steady state. Thus we have shown
* < 0 if X is small
— (30)dS S—0
> if (A) < tA) ( 1
— 16 —
IV. Conclusion
In this paper 'we have developed an overlapping generations model based on
individual utility maximization subject to uncertainty about the date of
death. We used this model to examine the dynamic behavior of consimption and
bequests in an econcny 'with consiuners who have different probabilities of
dying. Even though there are markets in annuities and in riskless bonds, con—
sumers are unable to offset the introduction of actuarially fair social secu—
rity. The reason is that adverse selection in the private annuity market
leads to a rate of return on private annuities which is lower than the rate of
return implicit in compulsory social security.
The introduction of actuarially fair social security raises the steady
state average levels of bequests and first—period consimption; it reduces the
steady state rate of return on private annuities. If the bequest motive is
sufficiently weak, then an increase in fully funded social security benefits
reduces private wealth by more than one—for--one. With a sufficiently strong
bequest motive, an increase in social security taxes crowds out private wealth
by less than one—for—one.
—1—
Footnotes
1. The seminal work in this area is Yaari (1965), which provided the frame-
work for later work by Eakausson (1969), Fischer (1973), Richard (1975),
Levhari and Mirnian (1977), Barro and Friedman (1977) and Kotlikoff and
Spivak (1981).
2. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) examine the role of the family in providing
an (incomplete) annuities market but stop short of a full—scale overlap-
ping generations model in which the intra—cohort distribution of bequests
is determined endogenously.
3. See Kotlikoff, Shoven and Spivak (1983) and Karni and Zilcha (1984) for
interesting extensions of the overlapping generations model in which con-
sumers within a cohort have different ex post mortality experiences.
4. Their analysis is more general than an analysis of annuity markets which
are based on lifetime uncertainty; it applies more generally to mandatory
insurance as a partial remedy for adverse selection in insurance markets.
In particular, Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled pay careful attention to
various concepts of equilibrium.
5. We follow Yaari (1965), Hakansson (1969), Fischer (1973) and Richard
(1975) in specifying utility as a function of the size of the bequest
left to one's heir. An alternative formulation which also gives rise to
a bequest motive is to specify utility as a function of one's heir's
utility as in Barro (1974) and Drazen (1978).
The specification of utility as a function of the size of the
bequest left to one's heir was chosen for tractability. The substantive
results of this paper do not depend on choosing this specification rather
than the specification suggested by Barro (1974). In particular, the
fast that social security affects consumption and capital accumulation
depends, not on the particular specification of the bequest motive, but
rather on the fact that adverse selection drives a wedge between the
rates of return on social security and on private annuities. In the
absence of adverse selection, fully funded social security would not
affect consumption regardless of whether the bequest motive is specified
as in this paper or as in Barro (1974).
6. Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) have derived a similar result in a model
which is similar in spirit, but different in detail from the model in
this paper.
7. If A > j, then all of the results in this paragraph are reversed.
8. To derive this implication, we observe that (as will be argued below)
competition in the annuity market will prevent the rate of return A from
being less than R Let N(p,A) be the numerator of q1(p,A) in (A—8b),
'—p
i.e., N(p,A) 1 + [1 — ()a()a] Observe that 8N/ôp < 0 and
—2—
8N/8A > 0. Next observe that N(p11, RL) will be positive if and only if
i—p
1
L a H
D
> H which will be true if and only if equation (12)
'—p
1+X
holds. Note that the term on the left of the first inequality in (12) is
less than pH since this term can be written as
—i
[1 + (1H)[(1 + )a )a_1])1E Therefore, given H X, and a, the set
of possible values for is not empty.
Since we have shown that (12) implies that N(PH, RL) > 0, it foi-
l—p
lows from 8N/8p < 0 and aN/aA>0 that N(p,A) > 0 for p jp11 and A > RL if
-
'—p
(12) holds. Therefore, equation (12) implies that q1(p,A)> 0, since the
denominator of the right hand side of (A—8b) is positive.
9. The Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) demonstration that there cannot be a
pooling equilibrium depends on their assumption "that customers can buy
only one insurance contract". As they point out themselves, "this is an
objectionable assumption" (p. 632). The appropriate equilibrium concept
in the presence of monitoring of purchases from other companies still
requires further research. The equilibrium described in this paper has
some desirable characteristics and is suitable for our purposes.
10. The proof of this lemma is
H H
p p* p
I f(p)g(p)dB(p) = I f(p)g(p)dH(p) + I f(p)g(p)dH(p)
L L p
p p
B
p* p
g(p)[ I f(p)dH(p) + I f(p)dH(p)] = 0. q.e.d.
L
p
11. More generally, when a is not equal to one we ave not ruled out multi-
ple roots of ir(A) = 0 in the interval ( L'— Nonetheless, we can
rule out as possible equilibria those ro fo1rwhich i'(A) > 0 by
observing that if such an A were the prevailing rate of return on private
annuities, a firm could offer a slightly higher rate of return and pro-
fitably attract all annuity purchases. Thus the equilibrium rate A is
characterized by n'(A) < 0. Henceforth, we assume that this inequality
—3—
holds strictly.
12. See Appendix C for conditions under which O(p,A)<1.
13. In Appendix C, we present condition under which O<e(A)<1. Thesecondi—
tions guarantee that B*>O if Y—T+A S>O and will guarantee that B
approaches the steady state B* monotonically.
14. It can also be shown that wth with logarithmic utility the introduction
of actuarially fair social security leads to an increase in the amount of
riskiess bonds held in the portfolios of young consumers. This result
fllows froin1the fact that riskless bond holdings are proportional to
A(I+Y—T+A S). (Substitut4g (A—3b) into (A15b) i Appendix A and then
sehing e equal to 1 yields 6 = [I+&(l—p+X)1 p&.Rj.) Since theAintro_duction of social security leads to a reduction in X, the factor
rises. We have already shown that the steady state expected presen
value of lifetime income rises with the introduction of social security.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix we calculate the optimal values of 01,c2, and BS for
the case in which U() and V() each have constant relative risk aversion equal
to a . Because U'(c) = c0 and V'(B) = )Ba, the first—order conditions (6a—
c) may be rewritten as
1
C1 [(i—p)&?.A] aBS (A—la)
1
02 =
aJ3 (A—lb)
B' = [P (y))aBs (A—ic)
Substituting (A—la—c) into the lifetime budget constraint (5) yields
1 —l 1
BS = A(I+Y—T)+S—(A[(i-p)&XA] a++(i)&-)a}B5 (A—2)p R
Re—writing (A—2) , we obtain
BS = 05(p,A)(I+Y—T + AS) (A—3a)
where
OS(pA) = A(l+ +[(l_P)5X)aAa + ()a(y)a)_1 (A-3b)
Substituting (A—3) into (A—la) and simplifying yields
Cl = (p,A)(I+Y—T+A1S) (A—4a)
where
ii-i 1 1 11 1_i
6(p,A) = {l+&aAa [(l_p)(i+Xa)+paAa(j) a]F1 (A—4b)
To obtain an expression for BD, substitute (A3—a) into (A—ic) which
yields
BD = OD(p,A)(I+y_T+A—is) (A—5a)
wh crc
OD(P,A) = (2)°()oS(p,A) (A—5b)
The average bequest left by a type p consumer, B*(p), is equal to
PBD + (i_p)BS. Therefore, from (A—3) and (A—5) it follows that
B*(p) = O(p,A)(I+Y—T+AS) (A—6a)
where
O(p,A) = [i-p + P(iP)a(L)a]OS(P,A) (A-6b)
Finally we calculate the demand for private annuities by substituting
(A—ib) and (A—ic) into (4) to obtain
Q(p,A)+AS = (i+xa_()a(y)a)A_lBs (A-7)
Substituting (A—3a,b) into (A—7) yields
Q(p,A)+AS q1(p,A)(I+y_T+A1S) (A—Ba)
where
-
q ( A) = (A—Sb)iP 1 i ii 1 i
i*ôa(i_p)aA+X i+()a(Aj)a
Atendix B
In this Appendix we show that under logarithmic utility, ( = 1), and
with I+Y—T>O and SO, n(A) is strictly concave for A>R.
First we differentiate (14) twice ,{th respect to A to obtain
= + 2- ff + ftQ*M]dfl(p) (Hi)
L 8A2 8A2
p
From (13), it follows that
= _11_
(B3)
8 A2
Setting a=1 in (A—8b) and differentiating with respect to A yields
= (p) > 0 (B4)
(A—R)2
Differentiating (lOb) with respect to A and using (B4) we obtain
= '(p)[A + 1, ] (B5)
(A-R)2
It follows from (B4) and (B5) that
ff
= t(p)(I+Y—T)+ø(p)(A2 p&X
(A—R)2 (A—R)2
Differentiating (B6) with respect to A yields
8—. =
—2t&XR6(p)(I+y_T)_2Ø(p)[A3+ t)&X is (B7)
8A2 (A—R)3 (A—R)3
Substituting (13), (Hi), (Hi), (B6), and (B'7) into (Hi) yields
=
—2() [P (I+Y—T)+[A+ P ]RS)dH(p)<O, if A>R (BS)
(A—R)3 (A—R)3
Appendix C
In this Appendix we restrict our attention to the case of logarithmic
utility (a = 1) and derive conditions under which < and conditions under
which < 1. We begin by defining the function '(p,q) as
+ 1P))] (Cl)
Now define p* (L < p* < pH) as the probability of dying young which is impli-
cit in the rate of return on private annuities, i.e.,
R = (l_p*)A (C2)
Frc*i the definition of 6(p,A) in (A—6b) and using (A—3b) and (A—4b) it
can be shown that with logarithmic utility (a = 1)
O(p,A) 6(p)8)A[(l—p)2+p2] (C3)
Then using (Cl) and (C2), we may rewrite (C3) as
O(p,A) = 6(p)BRy(p,p*) (C4}
Differentiating y(p,q) twice with respect to p and q demonstrates that
y(p,q) is strictly convex in p and in q so that
(p,q) 1[y(pL,q), y(pHq)] (C5)
H
sup y(p,q) = max[y(pp '' 7'P'P
It can also be shown that
mm y(p,q) = y(p,p) = X (C7)
Combining (C5), (C6) and (C7 ), we obtain
y(p,q) < x[y(pL,p11), 7(R,L)] for (C8)
Note that for a given p'-' (or PH), .y(pL,pH) and (H,L) are maximized by
maximizing (or minimizing DL). Recall, however, that we have restricted
the values of L and p11 in (12) in order to asse positive demands for annui—
H
ties by all consiers. Setting p- equal to its lower bound yields
< j(l—p11+X)(X+p11) (C9)
Similarly, setting p = 1+XL we obtain
7(LH) ( J(1_L÷),)+L) (do)
Frmi (C9) and (do), it follows that
y(p,q) < 1[X+X2+max(pI1-p11 lL)] (Cli)
From (Cli) it follows that
y(p,q) < 1 if < pL < p11 (C12a)
or if 2 < (C12b)
Thus horn (C4) and (C12), and recalling the definitions of and , we have
0 < if 8K . 1 and if . < max[pl,(3/4)i1'2] (c13)
Next we establish conditions under which Ô < 8 < 1. It follows immedi-
ately from (C4) that
6(p,A) 1 8K sup 0(p) sup y(p,q.) (Cl4)K
Since (H_L)(l_LR) it follows from (Cli) that if
1 1, then
p y(p,q) = (1+pj (C15)
Using the definition of (p). (C15) may be rewritten as
sup (p,q) )+ , f pL+pll< 1. (C16)
L H ô(p)
p ..p,qIp
Using (C16) and the fact that sup 0(p) = Ø(H), (C14) yields
O(pA) < H (l_6(H))+P < H, if + pH < 1 (C17)
Now suppose that 6 = H = = 1 and that pL+pH.. 1. It follows from (Cu)
that 6(p,A) < 1 and hence 6 < 1. It follows from (C4) and (C8) that
O(p,A) .. 6(p) with strict inequality for p p. Therefore 6 > SO that we
have established the existence of parameter values for which < 1.
Appendix D
In this Appendix, we show that with logarithmic utility (a 1), '(A)1O
if S = 0. It follows from the definition of (A) in (20b) that
= h1dfl(p) (Dl)
Differentiating (C3) with respect to A yields
1LPA1 =
_(p)o[pR+(l_p)(A_R)]M.AJ (D2)
(A— R)2
Substituting (Dl) into (D2) yields
H
=
—tf(p)g(p)dH(p)<0 if S0 (D3a)
where
f(p) = —k M(p,A)Q(p,A) (D3b)
(A-R)2
g(p) =
.LP?i3.ft)_1& (D3c)
The inequality in (D3a) follows immediately from the Lemma after observing
H
that I f(p)dfl(p) = ir(A) = 0 and showing that g1(p)O. Below, we show
(A—R)2
that if S=O, then g'(p)>O.
Using (lOa), (A4b) and (A8b) we find that with logarithmic utility and
S= 0
a(Q/•) =
—6(l+?)(I+Y—T) (D4)
Differentiating (D3c) with respect to p and using (D4) yields
g'(p) 1 -_----{62(1+2).)R(I+Y—T)) > 0 (D5)
[Q(p,A)I$(p)]2
